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Non-linear income taxes and linear commodity taxes are analysed when people differ with 
respect to ability, high-skilled agents have heterogeneous preferences, and neither individual 
abilities nor preferences are observable. The paper highlights how informational constraints 
may motivate differential treatment of people with different preferences for leisure even if 
unequal treatment is not desirable per se. Which preference type will be better or worse off is 
shown to depend on the self-selection constraints associated with the information asymmetry.  
We characterize pure income tax optima, which may be bunching or separating 
optima. In particular, the income tax may not be able to distinguish between those low-
income people who are low-skilled and those who have strong preference for leisure. As is 
shown, there may still be an impact on the optimum income tax schedule as it will depend on 
the composition of the population with respect to types of individuals. Finally, the paper 
addresses what can be achieved by commodity taxes when preferences are heterogeneous, in 
particular, in terms of targeting groups that the income tax is incapable of discriminating 
between.  
JEL Code: H21, H23. 
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 1. Introduction 
There can be little doubt that in practice people are endowed with heterogeneous 
preferences and therefore choose different consumption bundles even if they have the 
same income or wage rate and face the same prices. Some have a strong taste for 
travelling, dining at restaurants, and going to the theatre, whilst others prefer to invest 
in housing and household durables to enjoy more time at home.  Some prefer to put a 
lot of effort into a highly paid job, whilst others prefer a quiet and less stressful life. 
Although it is easy to recognise the variety of tastes in the population, optimum tax 
theory has been surprisingly silent on this score. Whilst a standard assumption is that 
various agents have different endowments or skill levels that motivate a distributional 
role for taxes, it has almost invariably been assumed that the same utility function 
motivates individual choices. An important question is whether neglecting differences 
in preferences is justified or whether the recognition of heterogeneity of preferences 
should impact the choice of tax policy. Should the income tax schedule be responsive 
to the distribution of preferences? Does preference heterogeneity make a difference 
when it comes to commodity taxes?  
To address these questions we shall consider a population of individuals 
differing along two dimensions. There are low-skilled and high-skilled individuals 
with the latter group being comprised of people with strong preference for leisure and 
people with weak preference for leisure. All low-skilled are assumed to have weak 
preference for leisure.  
Roughly speaking there are two approaches to the issue of how to treat equally 
skilful people with different preferences. One is what we may call the horizontal 
equity approach, which imposes the restriction that equally skilful individuals should 
be treated in some sense equally, for instance by being faced with the same tax 
liability irrespective of preferences. The other one is the social welfare approach, 
which implies that a social welfare function for all individuals, with their respective 
skills and preferences, is maximised even if that may imply different treatment of 
people with identical skill levels. The discussion of how to treat different types of 
people is often taking place under the explicit or implicit assumption that there is full 
information about individual skills and preferences. It is then conceivable that one 
may impose a high, and possibly uniform, tax on high-skilled individuals irrespective 
of preferences, and tax leniently, or make a transfer to, low-skilled individuals.  
  1When there is asymmetric information about individual skills and preferences the 
perspective may be different. Even if at a no-tax point of departure there is considered 
to be no case for redistribution between equally skilful people, the case for equal 
treatment may be weakened as soon as vertical redistribution takes place, and 
asymmetric information constrains how taxes can be imposed. Assume that one starts 
redistributing from high-skilled people to low-skilled people. In the extreme case 
high-skilled people with strong preference for leisure and low-skilled individuals will 
make the same choice of observable income points. Any income point intended for 
the low-skilled will be adopted by the high-skilled with strong preference for leisure, 
and the equal treatment of all high-skilled breaks down. An attempt to redistribute 
from all high-skilled to low-skilled is not feasible as the high-skilled with strong 
preference for leisure will in fact be treated as low-skilled. One cannot at the same 
time treat all high-skilled equally and high-skilled and low-skilled differently. Vertical 
redistribution and horizontal equity becomes irreconcilable objectives.  
In less extreme cases different income points may be assigned to the high-
skilled with strong preferences for leisure and low-skilled individuals, respectively, 
but only subject to a self-selection constraint. Attempted redistribution from high-
skilled to low-skilled may induce high-skilled with strong preference for leisure to 
start mimicking the low-skilled. The income point assigned to the low-skilled must be 
sufficiently distorted to discourage the high-skilled with strong preference for leisure 
from mimicking by choosing the same income point. The implication is that the 
transfers to the low-skilled are costly in terms of distortions. However, the cost can be 
reduced by lowering the transfer from the high-skilled with strong preference for 
leisure, who is the potential mimicker, whilst relying more on transfers from the high-
skilled with weak preference for leisure. This will alleviate the cost of transfers to the 
low-skilled but only by abandoning equal treatment of the high-skilled with different 
preferences (horizontal equity).  The general argument is that transfers from different 
types of high-skilled individuals may imply different costs under asymmetric 
information and hence employing the less costly alternative may be preferable, but 
only by violating horizontal equity.  
Our conclusion is that it may be crucial to distinguish between full information 
and asymmetric information regimes when it comes to discussing the tax treatment of 
equally skilful individuals. It may be that horizontal equity can be enforced without 
serious problems under full information, or there may be no social welfare case for 
  2redistribution between different high-skilled persons under full information, but this 
may be entirely different under asymmetric information. Imposing horizontal equity 
may then be costly. A social welfare approach may treat the various types of high-
skilled individuals differently, not because that is desirable per se, but because it is 
part of a scheme involving transfers to low-skilled individuals. Assuming that we do 
indeed treat the high-skilled individuals differently by taxing more leniently those 
with strong preference for leisure (in order to reduce the cost of vertical 
redistribution), it is plausible that different social marginal utilities of income will be 
assigned to the high-skilled individuals even if no such discrepancy would exist in the 
no-tax regime. Below we shall pursue the welfare approach to elaborate on 
conceivable income tax optima when high-skilled individuals may be taxed 
differently.  
Heterogeneity of preferences can, roughly classified, be of two kinds. People 
can have different trade-offs between income and leisure, or they can have different 
preferences for consumption bundles bought in the market, in the sense that they will 
buy different consumption bundles even if they have the same income and leisure and 
face the same prices. We may note that various combinations of the two types of 
preferences are conceivable. People may be endowed with different preferences for 
leisure, while still having the same preferences for market goods. People may also 
have different preferences for leisure because they have different preferences for 
market goods. The reason is simple. Since income is used for buying market goods, 
the preferences for market goods may affect the trade-off between income and leisure. 
We shall survey preference heterogeneity in further detail below.  
As has been discussed by some authors (e.g. Cuff (2000)), heterogeneity of 
preferences can be given different interpretations. A stronger preference for a good 
may sometimes be interpreted as meaning that a person has a stronger need for the 
good in question. Indeed the person may have a disadvantage or handicap that can 
only be alleviated, at least partially, by consuming some good. In such a case we will 
perceive this person as being worse off if he does not get more than others of the good 
he has a special need for, and even then he may not be fully compensated for his 
handicap. A clear-cut example may be a person in need of medication. On the other 
hand it is also conceivable that a sort of handicap may induce a weaker preference for 
a commodity. An illiterate person will have a weak preference for books, as opposed 
  3to a person with an intellectual mind. Thus a strong preference for a good may be 
interpreted either as reflecting a handicap or a particular ability to enjoy a good.  
We will consider heterogeneity of preferences that neither reflects a superior 
nor an inferior overall endowment. People are simply different, without being 
systematically more or less well endowed physically, mentally or emotionally. They 
have different pure tastes. A central assumption is that the government cannot observe 
an individual’s preferences. The government knows the distribution of preferences, 
but not the identity of people with the respective tastes.  
The very small literature on taxation of a population of agents with 
heterogenous preferences has adopted various approaches. Sandmo (1993) asked how 
one should tax people who are endowed with the same resources, but have different 
preferences. Even in this very simplified setting there are few general conclusions to 
be drawn. Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999) used numerical specifications to derive 
computationally optimum non-linear tax schedules for a continuum of agents 
simultaneously distributed by skill level and preferences for income and leisure. Their 
findings are interesting as illustrations of possible optima. However, their results 
could be sensitive to the specifications that have been made
2. Assuming a special 
class of utility functions, Boadway et al. (2002) considered a discrete distribution of 
individuals asssuming there are two skill levels and two types of preferences. 
However the high-skilled person with strong preference for leisure cannot be 
distinguished from the low-skilled person with weak preference for leisure and must 
always be treated equally. The aim of their analysis is to trace the income tax 
implications of assigning different welfare weights to the high-skilled person with 
strong preference for leisure.  
Saez (2002) discusses the role of commodity taxes supplementing an income 
tax in a very general framework with a continuum of individuals from a 
multidimensional set. The focus of his study is to identify conditions under which the 
Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) result of zero commodity taxes can be recovered in a setting 
with heterogeneous preferences. The present paper is rather concerned with cases in 
which Saez’ generalised Atkinson-Stiglitz conditions are not fulfilled, and 
accordingly there is scope for discussing the need for, and characterizing, the 
optimality conditions for commodity taxes. In contrast to Saez the present paper uses 
                                                 
2 A main finding is that preference heterogeneity does not necessarily lower the progressivity of the 
income tax. 
  4a model with a small, discrete number of types of individuals. Jordahl and Micheletto 
(2002) discussed tax policy implications of imposing a horizontal equity requirement 
when preferences for leisure vary. Cuff (2000) considered heterogeneous preferences 
in the context of workfare adopting a special class of utility functions.  
In view of the existing literature, and in particular the discussion of Sandmo 
(1993) an appropriate question seems to be: Why is it so hard to draw conclusions 
about distributional policy when preferences vary? Part of the answer seems to be that 
making interpersonal utility comparisons is particularly hard when preferences are 
acknowledged to be heterogeneous
3. Even if in principle we find ourselves able to 
compare utilities, who is judged to be better off may depend on the parameters of the 
economy such as prices and wage rates. Even if person A is judged to be better off 
than person B for one set of parameters the difference may be evened out or reversed 
if there is a change to a different set of parameters. The implication is that even if we 
are willing to base utility comparisons on strong assumptions, there is the further 
difficulty of obtaining sufficiently robust assumptions, i.e. assumptions that are 
sufficiently invariant to the specific parameters of the economy we study. However, 
there is even a further challenge. As emphasised by Sandmo (1993) the direction of 
redistribution should be governed by differences in marginal rather than total utilities. 
This would be a rather uninteresting statement if there were a unique relationship 
between total and marginal utilities, but this will only be true under very restrictive 
assumptions. In general the marginal utility of income does not only depend on which 
indifference curve that is assigned to the person but also on the particular commodity 
bundle that generates the corresponding utility.   
Throughout our discussion we shall make the assumption that, based on pure 
(marginal) utility comparisons it would be desirable to make further transfers to the 
unskilled individuals. The actual transfer is, however, limited by the informational 
constraints facing the decision-maker. This is in line with the standard assumption in 
the (conventional) tax theory with individuals of different skills, but homogeneous 
preferences. In our context we shall even assume that it is desirable to improve the 
welfare of the low-skilled when comparing with both high-skilled types. This implies 
a comparison across preferences and is a stronger assumption than the conventional 
one. However, we shall leave open the outcome of (marginal) utility comparisons 
                                                 
3 This formidable task seems to require further empirical research in the border area of psychology and 
economics.  
  5between the high-skilled individuals with different preferences, and consider 
alternative cases.  
Heterogeneity of preferences can affect the choice of income tax schedule, the 
case for employing commodity taxes and the rates of these taxes. We shall address all 
these aspects.  
In the next section we provide a taxonomy of preference heterogeneity. 
Section 3 addresses various pure income tax optima when preferences are 
heterogeneous, and examines the effects of changing the composition of the 
population. Section 4 discusses what commodity taxes can achieve when preferences 
are heterogeneous. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  A taxonomy of preference heterogeneity 
The simplest models of labour supply assume that there is only a single market 
commodity, and preferences solely reflect the trade-off between the consumption of 
this homogeneous commodity and labour (or leisure). In general people have 
preferences over bundles of market commodities and labour, and these preferences 
may be identical, or heterogeneous in various ways. We may in general write the 
utility function as  where the superscript i  indicates a particular type of 
preference, z denotes a vector of market commodities, and h is hours of work. Since 
there is a unique relationship between labour and leisure, we may choose to express 
preferences in terms of either of these variables. We opt for labour as argument in the 
utility function.  
) , ( h z u
i
A problem with this general approach is that it covers a multitude of 
preferences, and without further restrictions almost any behavioural variation and any 
welfare considerations are possible. Therefore it is helpful to start by identifying 
certain classes of preferences, distinguishing between preferences for market goods on 
the one hand and the trade-off between market goods and leisure on the other hand.  
Let us consider the following categories of preferences: 
i.   There are identical preferences for market commodities, but different preferences 
for labour, which is assumed to be weakly separable from market goods in the utility 
function. The utility function belongs to the class u . Choosing his 
bundle of market commodities, the consumer will maximise   s.t. the budget 
constraint B=pz, with B denoting after tax income and p the price vector, and we get 
) ), ( ( ) , ( h z f u h z
i i =
) (z f
  6the maximum value function f*(p, B). The preferences for after tax income and labour 
are then expressed by  .  ) ), , ( * ( ) , , ( h B p f u h B p v
i i =
), , ( ( ) , ( h h z f u h z
i i =
, , ( * ( ) , , ( h B p f u h B p v
i i =
, ( * ( ) , , ( p f u h B p v
i i =
                   
 
ii)   Labour is not weakly separable from market goods, but conditional on labor there 
are uniform preferences for market goods, while preferences for labour differ. The 
utility function is of the form  u , assumed to be increasing in the 
first argument and deceasing in the second. The preferences for after tax income and 




iii)    Labour is weakly separable from market commodities. Preferences for 
market goods are heterogeneous, whilst people have the same preferences for leisure 
and market commodity aggregates. The utility function is of the form 
, where the interpretation is that it is the ordinal properties of the 
f-function that may vary between consumers
) ), ( ( ) , ( h z f u h z u
i i =
4. The preferences for after tax income 
and labour are expressed by  .  ) ),h B
 
iv)  Labour is not weakly separable from market commodities, and preferences for 
market commodities are heterogeneous. Obviously no separability is obtained in the 
corresponding -function.  
i v
On the basis of this discussion we recognise that the income/labour trade-off 
expressed by a utility function v(B,h) can originate from several underlying basic 
preference patterns from which its properties are derived. In particular, we note how 
(non-)separability between after tax income and labour depends on the properties of 
the underlying basic utility function.  
Most previous contributions have abstracted from the plurality of market 
commodities and have just addressed preferences for disposable income and labour 
without discussing how the disposable income is spent. We may note that when there 
are underlying preferences for multiple commodities the corresponding price vector 
affects the location and shape of indifference curves in h,B-space.  
 
                              
4 A specific example might be  where  and b are positive parameters and   is type 
specific. 
b a a h z z
i i −
− 1
2 1 i a i a
  73. Income taxation when there is heterogeneity in preferences between leisure 
and consumption 
We will apply a three-type version of a Mirrlees (1971) optimal income tax model, 
which is similar to the extensively employed two-type model first introduced by Stern 
(1982) and Stiglitz (1982). Each type of person has a skill level, which is reflected by 
his exogenous wage rate, w. We will index the three types of individuals of our model 
economy in the following way: type 1 is a low-skilled person with weak preference 
for leisure, type 2 is a high-skilled person with strong preference for leisure and type 3 
is a high-skilled person with weak preference for leisure. We will denote the wage 
rate of a low skill person by   and that of a high skill persons by  = . A person 
of type i (=1,2,3) will earn a before-tax income Y . Even if these statistical 
properties of the population are public information, we shall assume that there is 
asymmetric information in the sense that the government (tax authority) is informed 
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Y                   
         Figure  1  
 
To give a first basic intuition for the labour-leisure trade-offs, we make use of figures 
1 and 2.  In figure 1 we depict a situation with no taxation. The assumptions implied 
by figure 1 is that at any point in the (Y ) space type 1 has steeper indifference 
curves than type 2, and type 2 has steeper curves than type 3.  Since the type 2 person 
has the same skill (wage rate) as the type 3 person, but works less and earns less 
B ,
  8income, we say that the type 2 person has a strong preference for leisure. There are of 
course other possible patterns than the one illustrated in figure 1. For example, the 
type 1 person could have his earnings point between the earnings points of type 2 and 
type 3. However, the general insights do not depend on the exact pattern, so let us 









Our ethical premise is that redistribution from the high skill persons to the low skill 
persons is warranted. However, as was the conclusion of Sandmo (1993) we cannot in 
general tell whether we would like to redistribute between equally skilful individuals. 
In the absence of such knowledge, we shall assume there is indeed no reason to 
redistribute from one high skill person to the other unless the cost of redistribution to 
the low skill person differs between the two high skill types. If we are in the situation 
illustrated in figure 1 we can start taxing the type 2 and 3 persons by the same 
amounts, transferring the proceeds to the type 1 persons. This can go on in a non-
distortionary way until we reach the situation illustrated in figure 2. Here the self-
selection constraint that the type 2 persons should not mimic the type 1 persons is on 
the verge of binding.  If we would like to push redistribution further, the cost will 
differ depending on whether we tax the type 3 or the type 2.  The ethical premise is 
that in the situation of figure 2 the utility loss would be the same whether we take one 
dollar from type two or type three. In an appendix we argue that it is possible to 
establish a social welfare function that embodies this ethical assumption. However, if 
  9we take a dollar from type 2 we can, due to the binding self-selection constraint, 
increase utility less for the type 1 person than if we take the dollar from the type 3 
person. If we take another dollar from type 3 and transfer it to type 1, we can move 
out along the indifference curve of the type 2 person. If we take a dollar from the type 
2 person, the indifference curve of type 2, shifts downwards, and it is along this lower 
level curve we can move the earnings point for the type 1 person. This implies a lower 
utility level for the type 1 person.  
  Hence, when we pursue further redistribution from the situation in figure 1, we 
will tax the type 3 more heavily than type 2, and there will be horizontal inequity. 
This is not because we want to redistribute between type 2 and type 3 per se, but 
because redistribution from type 3 to type 1 is more efficient.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate one possible pattern of indifference curves. There can be 
other patterns and other self-selection constraints that bind. For example, the optimum 
could be such that the binding self-selection constraint is that the type 3 should not 
mimic type 1. In general, there can be two classes of optima, a screening optimum, 
where the three types of individuals are assigned three distinct income points, or a 
bunching optimum such that the type 1 and type 2 persons are assigned the same 
income point. Below we characterize a screening optimum in section 3.1 and a bun-
ching case in section 3.2. We assume that the usual single crossing properties hold.  
 
3.1 Screening optima 
We will initially assume that indifference curves are such that the type 1 persons have 
the steepest slope as in the figures above. This implies that the type 2 person may 
mimic type 1 by choosing the income point intended for the latter, and conceivably 
type 3 may mimic type 2. There are n  persons of type i. The optimisation problem to 
be addressed is the maximisation of an additive welfare function (sum of utilities) 
subject to the budget and self-selection constraints. The corresponding Lagrange 
expression is 
i
( ) ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 Y B V Y B V Y B V n Y B V n Y B V n − + + + = Λ α  
( ) ( ) ) (( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) , (
3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 B Y n B Y n B Y n Y B V Y B V − + − + − + − + µ α     (1) 
where the Lagrange multiplier 
3 α  has been assigned to the self-selection constraint 
that type 3 should not mimic type 2, and 
2 α is assigned to the self-selection constraint 
  10that the high-skilled type with strong preference for leisure should not be mimicking 
the low-skilled. The last restriction is the government budget constraint.  
  The first order conditions are 
B
1:                                                                                            (2) 
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3:                                                   (6)
  
0
3 3 3 3 3 = − + n V V n B B µ α
Y
3:                                                             (7)
   
0
3 3 3 3 3 = + + n V V n Y Y µ α
Double superscripts indicate that a person, indicated by the former superscript, 
mimics some other person, indicated by the latter superscript. We denote the income 
tax function by T(Y).  It follows from eqs. (6) and (7) that the type three persons are 
undistorted facing a zero marginal tax ( . For a low skill person we obtain 
the usual result of a positive marginal tax. Manipulations of eqs. (2) and (3) yield 
, where  the marginal rate of substitution 
) 0 ) ( '
3 = Y T
11 2
1 '( ) ( ) 0 TY M R S M R S ρ =−
/ YB MRS V V =− 1 , andρ  denotes a positive term
5. For the high skill type with a strong 
preference for leisure, the type 2 persons, manipulations of eqs. (4) and (5) yield a 
similar expression TY . In general we cannot tell which 
type has the higher marginal utility of income or the higher marginal income tax.   
22 M R S
3 ) 0 M R S =−
2 > 2 '( ) ( ρ
Let us now consider the special case in which the constraint that type three 
should not mimic type two is non-binding, whilst the other constraint remains 
effective. This implies that  2 0 α >  and  3 0 α = . The first order conditions imply 
                      ( 8 )   1 / /
3 3 2 2 = − = − B Y B Y V V V V
                                                 
)
5 We adopt the standard approach of equating the marginal rate of substitution to the marginal income 
net of tax, i.e.  by which the marginal tax rate is implicitly defined.    /1 ' ( YB VV T Y −= −
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It is then easy to recognize that both high-skilled types will be undistorted, while the 
low-skilled type gets a distorted consumption bundle.  
Simple manipulations of the conditions above then imply that   
3
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and accordingly  
2 3 1
B B B V V V > > .                                                                                                     (13) 
Analogously we find when considering redistribution in terms of leisure (labour).  
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Y V ,                                                                                        (16) 
and accordingly  
2 3 1
Y Y Y V V V − > − > − .                                                                                               (17) 
We have assumed that transfers for the benefit of the low-skilled type are desirable to 
such an extent that he may be mimicked by high-skilled individuals. If only the 
mimicking constraint on the high-skilled type with strong preference for leisure is 
binding, the optimum is characterised by the social marginal utility of income being 
highest for the low-skilled and lowest for the high-skilled with strong preference for 
leisure.  
The following intuition supports our understanding of this case. As one 
redistributes from high-skilled to low-skilled, at some point type two would like to 
mimic type one, and further transfers from two to one become more costly as it 
requires a distortion of type one’s behaviour. This is a case for giving priority to 
transfers from type three, who is not (yet) induced to mimic. The larger transfers from 
  12type three implies that at some point he is considered to be over-taxed compared to 
type two in the sense that ideally one would like to redistribute from type 2 to type 3. 
The reason why this imbalance persists at the optimum is that, if one were to tax type 
2 harder, he would escape by mimicking type 1. Then there would be two options. i. 
One would have to worsen the situation also for type 1, which implies that a pure 
transfer from type 2 to type 3 is not feasible, and it is this additional cost in terms of 
lower welfare for the low-skilled that prevents the redistribution from taking place. ii. 
Alternatively one could maintain the utility of type 1, but only at the cost of further 
distorting the allocation, which would imply achieving the same utility at a higher 
resource cost. There would be a ‘leakage’ implying that for each income unit foregone 
by type 2, less than one unit would accrue to type 3.  
Ideally one would also like to make further transfers from the high-skilled to 
the low-skilled. A further transfer from the high-skilled with stronger preference for 
leisure is blocked by the standard mimicking problem. Appropriating a unit of income 
from the high-skilled does not allow a one unit transfer to the low-skilled as a further 
distortion is required in order to rule out mimicking. Similarly a transfer from type 3 
to type 1 would make the latter a more attractive target for mimicking by type 2.  
We next focus on the welfare maximising case corresponding to (1) where the 
only self-selection constraint is that the industrious high skill person should not mimic 
the low-skilled. We let    denote the Lagrange multiplier for this constraint. 














































  13where the sign follows from the standard assumption that the high-skilled type has the 
steeper indifference curve through any given point in Y,B-space. We get the 
conventional situation that the low-skilled person is distorted by a positive marginal 
tax rate at the optimum (efforts to increase gross income by one unit are rewarded by 
a smaller amount). Assuming no mimicking between high-skilled individuals, both 
high-skilled types are undistorted.  









































µ  (22) 
 
Then  V , (23) 
3 2 1
B B B V V > >
And similarly 
3 2 1
Y Y Y V V V − > − > − . (24) 
 
When only the mimicking constraint on the high-skilled type with weak preference 
for leisure is binding (i.e. type three is on the verge of mimicking), the optimum is 
characterised by the social marginal utility of income being highest for the low-skilled 
and lowest for the high-skilled with strong preference for leisure. In this case the 
difference of marginal utilities implies that ideally one would like to redistribute from 
type 3 to type 2. Once again it is the mimicking constraint that prevents such a 
transfer as it could not take place without adversely affecting the low-skilled person or 
adding to the resources required to ensure him the same utility as before. Also 
transfers from high-skilled to low-skilled would to some extent be eroded by 
mounting self-selection problems. For instance a transfer from type 2 to type 1 would 
require also ‘bribing’ type 3 or further distorting the transfer to person 1 to avert 
mimicking. 
  14Our intuition for how this regime comes about is that, as income is transferred 
from high-skilled to low-skilled, at some point type three is induced to mimic type 
one, whilst type two is not. The latter has such a strong preference for leisure that he 
will choose an income which is low, and an amount of leisure which is large even 
when comparing with the low skilled. Redistribution to the low-skilled is then cheaper 
when transfers are made from type two rather than from type three since the latter will 
require a distortion of the behaviour of the low-skilled. This may shift the emphasis to 
transfers from type two implying an income distribution between two and three 
favouring type three.    
 
3.2  Comparison of utility levels 
It is often claimed that redistributive taxes will favour high-skilled people with a 
strong preference for leisure. A famous example is Nozick’s question why someone 
preferring to look at the sunset should pay less tax than somebody who has to earn 
money in order to pay for material pleasures. (Nozick (1974)).  It may therefore be of 
interest to compare utility levels at the social optimum. In both cases of a single 
binding self-selection constraint we have obtained an ordering of marginal utilities. 
However, in general no ordering of utility levels is available since the marginal utility 
of income does not only depend on the utility level, but also on the bundle of goods 
that generates the utility level. For a fixed utility level V, and for convenience 
measuring labour supply by gross income Y, we can express B by an expenditure 
function  e(Y,V). The slope of the indifference curve in Y,B-space is dB/dY= . 
Inserting V(B,Y) we can write B=e(Y,V(B,Y)). Differentiating partially with respect to 
B we find the marginal utility of incomeV
Y e
V B e / 1 = . To trace the variation along the 










. It is easy to recognise that  >0 if 
leisure is strictly non-inferior. The marginal utility of income will in general depend 
on the consumption-labour bundle, and it will decrease along an indifference curve as 
the labour supply and income increase if leisure is a strictly non-inferior good. It 
follows that a low marginal utility of income may be assigned to a person although he 
has a low utility level if he is sufficiently far out along his indifference curve.  
YV e
The marginal utility of income will depend solely on the utility level (be 
constant along an indifference curve) only if there is no income effect on leisure 
  15( =0). That means that the utility function belongs to the class V= YV e ψ (B-g(Y)), and 
we see that V . We may call this utility function B-quasi 
linear.  
) ( ( ' )) ( ( '
1 V Y g B B
− = − = ψ ψ ψ
 
Two further assumptions will then allow us to draw conclusions about utility levels. 
Firstly we assume inequality aversion in the following sense. 
Assumption I  
For a given B-quasi-linear utility function the social marginal utility of income is 
decreasing in utility.  
Secondly we assume the following relationship between preferences and marginal 
utility. 
Assumption II 
When different persons with B-quasi-linear preferences are considered to enjoy the 
same utility level, an individual with stronger preference for income derives more 
utility from additional income. 
 
We can then easily establish the following insight.  
Lemma 1: Given assumptions I and II, if preferences are B-quasi-linear, and the type 
of person with weaker preference for income has the higher marginal utility of 
income, he has the lower utility. 
 
This is straightforward. If utility levels were the same, the person with stronger 
preference for leisure would have a lower marginal utility of income according to 
Assumption II. Since by Assumption I the marginal utility of income is decreasing in 
utility, it is only if the individual with stronger preference for leisure has a sufficiently 
lower utility that he will have the higher marginal utility of income. 
Given the special assumptions above, it is then straightforward to conclude 
that when the only binding self-selection constraint is that the high-skilled individuals 
with stronger preference for leisure (type 2) do not mimic the low-skilled individuals 
(type 1), the high-skilled individuals with stronger preference for income have a lower 
utility than the high-skilled with stronger preference for leisure. 
  16Analogously, it can be shown that the marginal utility of leisure is constant 
along an indifference curve only if the utility function is h-quasi-linear, i.e. it belongs 
to the class V ) ) ( ( h B − = ξ ϕ , whereϕ  and ξ are monotonic, increasing functions
6. 
 
Analogous to assumptions I and II we can state: 
 
Assumption III  
For a given h-quasi-linear utility function the social marginal utility of leisure is 
decreasing in utility.  
Assumption IV 
When different persons with h-quasi-linear preferences are considered to enjoy the 
same utility level, an individual with stronger preference for leisure derives more 
utility from additional leisure. 
 
As an analogy to Lemma 1 we can then easily establish  
Lemma 2: If preferences are h-quasi-linear, and the type of person with weaker 
preference for leisure has the higher marginal utility of leisure, he has the lower 
utility. 
 
We can then conclude that under these special assumptions, when the only binding 
self-selection constraint is that the high-skilled individuals with stronger preference 
for income (type 3) do not mimic the low-skilled persons (type 1), the high-skilled 
with stronger preference for leisure enjoy lower utility than the high-skilled with 
stronger preference for income. 
  Even if the two cases considered are polar cases, that we may not find 
realistic, they serve to illustrate that in general we cannot tell whether it is the 
hardworking type or the type with a liking for leisure who is better off at the optimum. 
The outcome will depend both on the utility function and on which self-selection 
constraints that will bind.  
                                                 
6 Let  (,) YB V ε = be the labour (gross income) that in conjunction with a disposable income B will 
yield the utility level V.  B ε  is the inverse of the slope of the indifference curve in Y,B-space. 








, which is zero 
only  if   BV ε =0. 
 
  17The following propositions summarise the characterisations of the two regimes 
with a single binding self-selection constraint.  
 
Proposition 1: When the only binding self-selection constraint is that the high-skilled 
individuals with stronger preference for leisure (type 2) do not mimic the low-skilled 
individuals (type 1), 
a.  both high-skilled individuals are undistorted while the low-skilled face a 
positive marginal tax rate, 
b.  the low-skilled individuals have the highest social marginal utility of income, 
and the high-skilled individuals with stronger preference for leisure have the 
lowest marginal utility of income. 
c.  assuming B-quasi-linear preferences and making assumptions I and II, the 
high-skilled individuals with stronger preference for income  have a lower 
utility than the high-skilled with stronger preference for leisure. 
 
Proposition 2: Let the only binding self-selection constraint be that the high-skilled 
individuals with stronger preference for income (type 3) do not mimic the low-skilled 
persons (type 1).  Then  
a.  both high-skilled individuals are undistorted while the low-skilled face a 
        positive marginal tax rate, 
      b.     the low-skilled individuals have the highest social marginal utility of income, 
        and the high-skilled individuals with stronger preference for income have the 
              lowest social marginal utility of income, 
      c.    assuming h-quasi linear preferences and making assumptions II and IV, the 
 high-skilled with stronger preference for leisure enjoy a lower utility than the 
 high-skilled with stronger preference for income. 
 
3.3 The bunching case and comparative statics. 
High-skilled people with strong preference for leisure may be hard to distinguish from 
low- skilled people. As a polar case we may consider the situation in which type 1 and 
type 2 have identical indifference maps in Y,B-space.
7  
                                                 
7 A special case would be the one presented by Boadway et al. (2002). 
  18Let   be the (gross and net) income bundle of type i. Since type 1 and 
type 2 have identical  indifference curves their income points must be on the same 
indifference curve. Otherwise, one of the income points would be strictly preferred by 
both types, and the other point could not be imposed through self-selection. Moreover, 
the same income on the common indifference curve must be assigned to both types at 
the optimum. If not, there would always be a gain from switching one of the 
individuals to the less resource consuming of the two points. Hence we can set 
i i B Y ,
1 2 Y Y = and 
1 2 B B = . Since an income tax cannot discriminate between types 1 and 
2, the only interesting tax issue is how the existence of different preferences will 
affect the respective taxes on category 3 on the one hand and on categories 1 and 2 on 
the other.  
We shall confine our attention to the information-constrained optima where 
the choice of policy is strictly constrained by the requirement that the high-skilled 
type with weak preference for leisure prefers the income point Y  actually 
intended for him.  
3 3,B
It is helpful to introduce the expenditure function e expressing the 
disposable income required by a person of type i in order to achieve the utility level V 
when his gross income is Y. We can describe the economy by the following set of 
equations. 
) , ( V Y
i
33 3 1 1 () () nY B m Y B −+ −= 0                                                                (25) 
) , (
1 1 1 1 V Y e B =                                                                                     (26)  
) , (
3 3 3 3 V Y e B =                                                                                    (27) 
) , (
3 1 3 1 V Y e B =                                                                                    (28) 
(25) is the budget constraint with m (= + ) being  the number of low-income 
people (of type one and type two). (26) and (27) follow from the definition  of the 
expenditure function, and (28) is the strictly binding self-selection constraint that the 
high-skilled person with weak preference for leisure obtain no higher utility when 
mimicking (choosing Y ) than the level V  achieved when choosing the income 
point actually intended for him. We approach the social optimisation in two steps, first 
considering the Pareto optima and then the welfare maximisation Assigning any 





  19maximising the utility of type 3 s.t. the budget and self-selection constraint
8 and also 
pegging the value of V . We may note that the common indifference curve of type 1 
and type 2 is steeper than that of type 3 through any given point in Y,B-space. That of 
type 2 is steeper by the difference in preference for leisure. That of type 1 is steeper 
by standard arguments
1
9 (see Stiglitz (1982)). It is a well-known property of the Pareto 
optimum that  
( m−
3 / de dY
3 =1   (the zero marginal tax at the top).                                                (29)                                       
Adding the condition for Pareto optimality, we have five equations implicitly 
defining all other variables as functions of V  including  V , which can be 
interpreted as a Pareto frontier. Even if consumers of categories 1 and 2 have identical 
indifference maps and thus a utility function in Y,B-space with the same ordinal 
properties, the welfare weights that the government assigns to income changes for the 
two categories may be different and governed by some transformation of the ordinal 






1 2 V ν >0, dictate the weight 
given to the high-skilled person with strong preference for leisure
10. By letting  ' ν <1, 
additional income for high-skilled with strong preference for leisure will be given less 
weight than additional income for low-skilled when the initial income point is the 
same.  
We can now examine how the choice of tax policy will be affected by the 
composition of the low income group. We can then examine how the composition of 
the m-group affects the tax design. By increasing   and lowering  correspondingly 
we see how taxes are affected by the fact that those with a low income consists not 
only of low-skilled persons, but also of high-skilled with a strong preference for 





33 22 2 1 ) nV nV n V Ω= + +                                                                             (30) 
                                                 
8 By substituting from (26) and (27) in (1) and equating the right hand sides of (27) and (28) we are left 
with two constraints and can maximise w.r.t. Y
1  and   Y
3.  
9 The intuition is the following. Type 1, being less productive, has less leisure for a given value of Y. 
Hence he requires a larger compensation in terms of B for a marginal increase in labour supply. Being 
less productive, he also has to increase working hours more in order to generate a unit increase in gross 
income. This reinforces the conclusion that a higher increase in B is required to offset the disutility 
from a marginal increase in Y, and the slope of the indifference curve must be larger.   
10 A more general transformation might have been considered, but to avoid unnecessary complications 
we have chosen the simplest possible one for the purpose.   
  20 
From the analysis above we can substitute V  for V  and V for 
and write the objective function as  
) (
3 1 V
1 )) ( (
3 1 2 V V ν =
2 V
33 2 1 3 2 1 3 (() )( )( nV n V V m n V V ν Ω= + + − )
3
                                                         (31) 
Maximising w.r.t. V we get the first order condition  
3
21 3 2 1 ' ' (/) ( )/ N n dV dV m n dV V ν Ω= + + − =0                                                  (32) 
The second order condition is  
'' 0 Ω< .                                                                                                                  (33) 
By comparative statics we can examine the effect of an increase in   for a fixed m 












                                                                                  (34) 







>0 if  '1 ν < .                                                                                                    (35) 
The following proposition states the result.   
 
Proposition 3: If low-skilled agents and high-skilled agents with strong preference 
for leisure, have identical indifference curves in Y,B-space, and if high-skilled agents 
with a strong preference for leisure are given a lower welfare weight than low-skilled 
individuals, a larger share of high-skilled agents in the low-income group motivates 
shifting more of the tax burden to the low-income group.  
   
In other words the tax should be less redistributive if more of the low-income people 
are in fact not low-skilled, but have a low income as a consequence of working few 
hours.  
The problem of distinguishing the low-skilled and the high-skilled with strong 
preference for leisure does not necessarily vanish even if people with different 
preferences have deviating indifference curves in Y,B-space since it may not be 
optimal to separate the two types at an income tax optimum. It may be optimal to have 
bunching of the low-skilled and the high-skilled with strong preference for leisure 
even though their indifference curves through the shared income point in Y,B-space 
have different slopes. If information on preference type were available, it might be 
  21desirable to tax the high-skilled, leisure-prone type harder than the low-skilled, but in 
the absence of such information differentiated taxation may not be desirable.  
The analysis above took as its point of departure the assumption of identical 
indifference curves of type 1 and type 2. However, what we actually used in the 
analysis was the fact that 
1 2 Y Y = and 
1 2 B B = , or in other words a bunching 
assumption. The latter is a less robust assumption as in the absence of identical 
indifference curves there may be bunching at the tax optimum for some values of V  
but not for others. We then have to take into account that in the course of the 




Proposition 4: If high-skilled agents with a strong preference for leisure are given a 
lower welfare weight than low-skilled individuals, a larger share of high-skilled 
agents in the low-income group motivates shifting more of the tax burden to the low-
income group as long as there is bunching of low-skilled  and high-skilled with strong  
preference for leisure.  
 
4. What can commodity taxes achieve in the bunching case? 
It is well known from the tax theory assuming homogeneity of preferences that an 
important role for commodity taxes may be to alleviate self-selection constraints of 
the kind considered above. (See for example Edwards et al. (1994)). This may be a 
role also in the case of heterogeneous preferences. A further role may be to provide a 
tool for taxing differently agents that the income tax is incapable of discriminating 
between. In fact this may happen also in the conventional theory, as there may be 
cases of bunching. However, we believe that the need is more urgent when 
preferences are heterogeneous as it is hard to distinguish between people who earn a 
low income because they are low-skilled, and people who choose a low income 
because they prefer to work short hours.  This motivates us to consider the role of 
commodity taxes when there is bunching of the low-skilled type and the high-skilled 
with strong preference for leisure.  
For expositional convenience we confine the price setting to the choice of a 
commodity tax for a single good. We denote by 
i x the quantity of this good consumed 
by an individual of type i, and denote the consumer price by p, and the tax by t. The 
  22pre-tax price is treated as fixed.  To maximise welfare subject to the budget constraint 
and self-selection constraint barring type 3 from mimicking, we formulate the 
Lagrange function: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 11 2 2 22 3 3 33 3 11 3 33 , , , , , , (, , ) (, , ) nV PY B nV PY B nV PY B V PY B V PY B β Λ = ++−−
() ( ) ()
3




nY B nY B nY B t x µ
=

+− + − + − + 
 ∑
                                         (36) 
                                 
where P is the consumer price vector. Since we are considering the bunching case we 
impose the conditions  12 B B =   and 
2 1 Y Y =  and rewrite the expression above as:                                        
() () ( ) ( )
1 1 11 2 2 11 3 3 33 3 11 3 33 ,, ,, ,, ( ,,) ( ,,) nV PY B nV PY B nV PY B V PY B V PY B β Λ= + + − −
() () ()
3




nY B nY B nY B t x µ
=

+− + − + − + 

  ∑                                        (37)                                  
The policy decision is to choose 
113 ,,,
3 B YBY  and t. The first order conditions with 
respect to 
113 ,,,
3 B YBY  are:  
  ( ) 0
31 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
1 = − + + + − + = Λ B B B B B B V n tx n tx n n V n V n β µ µ µ  (38) 
 
( ) 0
31 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
1 = − + + + − + = Λ Y Y Y Y Y Y V n tx n tx n n V n V n β µ µ µ  (39) 
 
                                                                      (40)  0
3 3 3 3 3 3
3 = + + − = Λ B B B B V n tx n V n β µ µ
3 3 33 33
3 0 YY Y
nV n t xn V Y µ µβ Λ= + + + =                                                                           (41) 
Using Roy’s theorem the first order condition with respect to t  (p) can be written as: 
( ) 0
3 3 31 31 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 = − + + + + + − − = Λ x V x V tx x n x n x n x V n x V n x V n B B p B B B p β β µ µ
                                                                                                                              (42) 
We will manipulate these first order conditions to obtain a formula for the commodity 
tax rate. For this purpose the following expression will be useful 
  22 2
2 (( 1 ) ) B B B
nV t x µ Λ= − −                                                                                     (43) 
This expression is obtained by differentiating eq. (36) partially w.r.t. 
2 B .  By the 
envelope theorem this is the welfare effect of a hypothetical increase in 
2 B , i.e. the 
welfare effect that would be obtainable if it were possible to undertake a partial 
increase in 
2 B . It reflects the desirability, but not the feasibility, of increasing the 
  23after-tax income (decreasing the income tax) for type two.  V  is the social benefit of 
increasing the after-tax income of a type two person, whereas   deducts the 
associated social cost, net of tax revenue, due to the commodity tax.  In general we 
cannot tell the overall sign. However, if the situation is such that we would like to tax 
a type two person harder and redistribute the proceeds to a low skill person, we would 
believe   to be negative.  
2
B
2 (1 ) B tx µ −−
2 B Λ
t
, 0 β µ
Letting   denote the substitution effect for the taxed good for individual i, 
defining  , and using the first order conditions (38)-(42) and the 
Slutsky decomposition, we can state: 
i s
11 s =+
22 33 Sn n s n s +
 
Proposition 5: Assume the income tax optimum is characterized by bunching of the 
low-skilled type and the high-skilled with strong preference for leisure, then we would 









=−                                                     (44)                                       
     
)
)
Proof: See Appendix B              
 
We recognize the second part of this formula as the usual “mimicking term”. The 
coefficient multiplying 
31 1 ( x x −  is positive (since V
31 > B  and   are positive 
Lagrange multipliers, and   is negative). Hence, the last term is positive if the 
“mimicker” consumes more of  the good in question than does the low skill person. 
We should use the commodity tax to deter mimicking, thereby mitigating the self-
selection constraint. Since the mimicker enjoys more leisure than the low skill person, 
the good should be taxed if the demand increases in leisure and subsidized if demand 
decreases in leisure. This is the same story as told in e.g. Edwards et al. (1994). 
S
The first term, which we will denote the “redistribution term”, is of another 
character.  The difference in consumption between the (actual) high skill person with 
a strong preference for leisure and the consumption of the low skill person is of 
crucial importance.   shows how we value an increase in after-tax income to a type 
two person. Let us for the moment assume this term is negative.  Then the term 
2 B Λ
  24( S
B µ / 2 Λ ) multiplying 
21 () x x −
                  
 is positive. If type two has a higher consumption 
than the low skill person, this term tends to increase the value of t. If the high-skilled 
type two is the larger consumer, one can impose a commodity tax and lower the 
income tax on the low-skilled individual to compensate him for the commodity tax 
burden. This tax relief will be inadequate to compensate the larger high-skilled 
consumer with strong preference for leisure. Thus an additional tax burden is imposed 
on exactly the person who was considered too leniently taxed in the first place.  
2 1 x x = =
2 B Λ
                                
To elaborate on the insights from formula (44), it is helpful to make use of the 
taxonomy in Section 2. Let us recall that the disposable income is the same for type 1, 
type 2 and the mimicker appearing in the formula. The hours of work is the same for 
the high skill person with strong preference for leisure and the mimicker, whereas the 
low skill person works more hours.  
In case i. of the taxonomy market goods are separable from leisure in the 
utility function, and preferences for commodities are the same. People who have the 
same disposable income will therefore have the same demand. This implies that 
 and that both the mimicking term and the redistribution term in (44) will 
vanish, and nothing can be gained by a commodity tax.  
31 x
If the preferences are of the form in case ii., that is uf , then the type 
two (actual) person and the (potential) mimicker will have the same consumption 
bundles, but the consumption for the low skill person will be different. If  is 
negative, the redistribution and mimicking terms will reinforce each other, and they 
both imply that there should be a commodity tax if demand increases in leisure and a 
subsidy if it decreases
( ( , ), )
i z hh
2 B Λ
11. In this sense the two terms are similar. However, note the 
difference that no tax revenue is actually collected from the mimicker, whereas the 
type two person actually pays the tax. Even though we regard it as the normal case 
that   is negative, it might conceivably be positive, and the two terms in eq. (44) 
would counteract each other.                                                                                                                           
11 A key assumption in Saez (2002) ensuring there is no need for commodity taxes is that conditional 
on income level the welfare weight assigned to additional income is uncorrelated to the consumption of 
individual goods. In our model it is clear that this condition is not satisfied if marginal income for the 
high-skilled is socially appreciated more highly than marginal income for the low-skilled when they 
choose the same income but different consumption bundles.     
 
 
  25If preferences are as in case iii. in our taxonomy, i.e. preferences for type 3 
and type 1 are of the form Uf , but for type two persons of the form  ( ( ), ) zh
(() ,) Uz h φ , then the low skill person and the mimicker will have the same 
consumption and the mimicker term in eq. (44) will vanish. However, the 
consumption of the high skill person with strong preference for leisure will differ 
from the consumption of the low skill person and the “redistribution” term will be 
nonzero. By exploiting the differences in consumption bundles one may impose 
commodity taxes on goods of which the high-skilled with strong preference for leisure 
have high consumption and possibly introduce subsidies favouring the low-skilled. 
Hence, even though we cannot use the income tax to redistribute from the high skill 
person with strong preference for leisure and the low skill person, we can achieve 
redistribution via the commodity tax.   
If the utility function is not separable and preferences are heterogeneous, i.e. 
type 1 and type 3 have a utility function Uz  and type 2 a utility function Uz  
the mimicking term would point in the direction of taxing the commodity if the 
demand according to Uz  increases with leisure. However, even if Uz  
implies a demand function where 
(,) h ( , ) h %
( , ) h % (,) h
2 x  is, say, increasing in leisure, it might still be the 
case that 
2 x  is less than 
1 x  and the redistribution term would motivate a subsidy.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have highlighted the problems involved in tracing the implications of 
heterogeneous preferences for optimum taxes. In this context we have argued that it is 
helpful to classify various types of preference heterogeneity. Which case that prevails 
is shown to be crucial for what can be achieved by various tax instruments.  
We have singled out two issues for further analysis. Firstly, we have 
characterised various income tax optima, showing how the treatment of people with 
different preferences will depend on the information constraints impeding income 
transfers. In particular we have discussed the case in which there is bunching of low-
skilled individuals and high-skilled people with strong preference for leisure, and 
demonstrated how the optimum income tax will then depend on the composition of 
the population.  We have also studied what assumptions are needed in order to rank 
individuals’ utilities. Secondly, we have discussed the role of commodity taxes. We 
have identified the preference cases in which tax differentiation not attainable by 
  26income taxes, can be achieved by means of commodity taxes. This may happen either 
because preferences for market commodities differ, or because high-skilled 
individuals have more leisure and leisure in turn induces consumption of certain 
commodities (leisure goods). Finally, we have discussed the interaction of preferences 
for market commodities and the preference for leisure, which implies that the trade-
off between income and leisure in general will be affected by prices and hence can be 
manipulated by commodity taxes. Interestingly, this may provide a tool for separating 
individuals that would otherwise be bunched together at the income tax optimum, but 




We want to argue that for given individual preferences it will normally be possible to 
assume such social preferences that the same marginal social utility of income is 
assigned to both types of high-skilled individuals when they are taxed equally. Let 
be some ordinal utility function representing the individual preferences of 
type i (=2,3), and consider the case in which both types of high-skilled individuals pay 
a tax T, so that the utility of type i is uY . At an undistorted allocation u  is 
maximised w.r.t. Y for a fixed T, and  as well as the utility level can be perceived 
as functions of T. To get a proper representation of social preferences, we choose a 











i f u , where  is then interpreted as the utility resulting 
from the selected cardinalisation, i.e.Vf . 
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 Assume that  2 f and  3 f can be chosen such that there is no case for transfers 








2 '( ) B
f u which, due to the envelope theorem, is equivalent to 
f uu
3
3 '( ) B =
3 f uu . The equation can be rewritten as: 
3
2






= u       ( A 1 )  
Normally we can find functions  2 f and  3 f  (with ) such that this condition 




3 f  has been chosen to reflect the 
  27distributional preferences with regard to people of type 3. With the functions , 
and 
2 u
3 u 3 f  being known, the right hand side of (A1) becomes a function of T. Let us 
further invert the relationship between u  and T, and write T as a (strictly decreasing) 
function of u . We can then express the r.h.s. of (A1) as a function of u , called  
, and  write (A1) as 
2
2 2
2 ( u ) ϕ
2
2 '( ) f u =  which is a differential equation. For a wide 
class of functions this be solved to obtain 
2 ( u ) ϕ
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Appendix B. 
Proof of proposition 5. 
Making use of the Slutsky decomposition we can rewrite eq. (42) as : 
  ) (
3 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 n s n s n t x n x x V n B B + + + + − µ   
    0
3 3 2 2 2 1 = + x V n x x n B B B β                                       (B1) 




1 31 2 1 1 2 = − + − x V x x n V B B β µ                               (B2)   
Multiplying (40) by − , yields 
3 x
3 33 3 t x nx µ µ −                                                                      (B3) 
We can make use of (B3) to eliminate a number of terms in (B1). Then adding each 
side of  (B1) and (B2) we obtain 
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 () () BB n xx t x xx n t S µ µ − + =                        (B4)     
where  .  Now returning to (36) and differentiating w.r.t. 
22 3 Sn n s n + 2, we 
find 
22 2 1 B B t x −                                                                                            (B5)  ) )
We can then reformulate (B4) as  
31 31 ( B xV x β − =                                                                       (B6) 
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